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Heidegger’s Notion of Religion: the limits of being-understanding 
 
The engagement with Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity1 is not a new topic of 
debate and there have been various excellent commentaries on this topic. The aim of this 
paper will not be to repeat or dispute these previous discussions, but rather, to posit 
Heidegger’s relationship with the question of religion in a new light. The aim of this paper is 
to disclose how religion is conceived in Heidegger’s path of thinking, and further, how the 
phenomenon of religion poses problems for Heidegger’s path of thinking.  
In the most general sense, this article will provide three arguments: the first that 
Heidegger in his early lectures on ‘primal Christianity’ delimits the notion of religion to an 
experience of the truth of being. Additionally, I will argue that in providing this interpretation 
of the notion of religion Heidegger will also find himself inevitably denying any authenticity 
to traditional religions and accordingly, inevitably looking for an alternative to traditional 
religion. Finally, I will argue that the phenomenon of religion itself reveals a fundamental 
distinction between ‘being’ and the ‘ground of being’ (or the otherwise than being). This 
explains the sub-title of the article insofar as I am arguing that a proper phenomenology of 
religion (in Heidegger’s sense of phenomenology; as ontology) discloses a major flaw in 
Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein as the entity who understands.   
 In attempting this task, I will provide two interpretations of Heidegger’s thinking in 
relation to religion. The first will be an interpretation of Heidegger’s early lectures on 
religion, published under the title of The Phenomenology of Religious Life. This will allow 
me to ascertain the implications of his interpretation of primal Christianity within the realm 
of the philosophical problem of grounding and also the preconception of religion founded 
                                                 
1
 Martin Heidegger himself coins the term ‘primal’ or ‘primordial’ Christianity in his 1920-1 lectures entitled 
‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’ in which he states: “Primordial Christian religiosity is in 
Primordial Christian life experience and is itself such.” (Martin Heidegger, 2004, p.55). This phrase is 
translated by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren as ‘primal Christianity’ in Reading Heidegger From the 
Start: Essays in his earliest thought (Kisiel & van Buren, 1994)  
therein. I will argue, on this basis, that Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity 
generates a conception of religion as merely ontical, which then serves as the basis for 
Heidegger’s later relation with religion.  
The second interpretation of Heidegger’s relation with religion, then, will focus on his 
later engagement with pre-metaphysical Greek thinking and German poetry. In this part of 
the paper I will provide a detailed exposition of how Heidegger relates to religious concepts 
and phenomena in his lectures on Parmenides (Heidegger, 1992), Heraclitus (Heidegger, 
1993), and then Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” (Heidegger, 1996).  I will argue on this basis 
that Heidegger conceives religion in these texts as an intrinsically ‘inauthentic’ phenomenon 
for which he will then seek a replacement. The questions this paper will ask of Heidegger’s 
thinking will be: how does religion pose problems for this path of thinking, how does the 
phenomenon of religion resist Heidegger’s interpretation, and thus, is there potential for 
religion to delimit the validity of the quest for the being of Dasein? 
 
§1. Key Concepts: 
The arguments that this paper provides operate on the basis of my use of two key concepts: 
‘religion’ and ‘authenticity’. The former, I am arguing, poses a problem for Heidegger’s path 
of thinking; the latter, I would claim, is pivotal to Heidegger’s conception and then dismissal 
of any possible genuine place of religion in the being of Dasein.  
 For the purposes of this paper I am using the term ‘religion’ to mean “the 
phenomenon of religion”. In other words, I am claiming that religion is a phenomenon in 
precisely the way that Heidegger defines phenomenon in Being and Time: “the showing-
itself-in-itself of the being of entities” (Heidegger, 1962, p.60). Any phenomenon, it follows, 
either is the being of the entity or ‘belongs-to’ to an entity in its being. On this basis, my use 
of the concept religion in this paper will signify ‘religion’ as a phenomenon that belongs-to 
and discloses the being of humans. I would argue that insofar as we conceive of religion as a 
phenomenon the meaning of religion is located in and grounded upon the capacity of humans 
(in our being) to be directed towards and have a relationship with that through which we 
uncover meaning and purpose for our living2. The question that the phenomenon of religion 
poses of Heidegger’s philosophy is this: If the concept of Dasein cannot adequately serve as 
the ground for the phenomenon of religion, then can we say that Dasein really (genuinely) 
signifies the being of humans? 
 The concept ‘authenticity’ or ‘Eigentlichkeit’ is a somewhat contested term in 
Heideggerian scholarship. Benjamin Crowe, in his work on Heidegger’s Religious Origins 
notes that there are three main interpretative trends in relation to the term: the first which he 
calls an ontological account, the second he calls the ‘narrativist’ reading, and the third, which 
he calls the ‘emancipatory’ reading (Crowe, 2006, pp164, 167-169). According to Crowe, the 
first interpretative trend emphasises the ontological character of the term as reflecting and 
fitting into Heidegger’s philosophical project as a whole (Crowe, 2006). The narrative 
account emphasises the connection between the concept of authenticity and ‘how’ we live 
and emphasises how the concept fits into Heidegger’s general account of selfhood (Crowe, 
2006).  The third and final account is one which views Heidegger as anticipating to some 
extent philosophers such as Derrida and Levinas; therein emphasising the ‘personal’ 
character of life (Crowe, 2006).  
The approach I will take in this paper is the first; the ontological reading exemplified 
by those like Thomas Sheehan who constitutes authenticity as intrinsically connected with an 
encounter with one’s own proper or true being: “one recuperates one's essence and thus 
attains ‘authenticity’ by becoming one's proper (or ‘authentic’) self” (Sheehan, 1998). 
Authenticity, I would argue, is a concept that harks back to and is grounded upon Aristotle’s 
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 This argument was the substance of my PhD thesis, now published as a book (Brook, 2009) and also a number 
of conference papers 
concept of φρονησις in the Nicomachean Ethics, especially as Heidegger interprets it to refer 
to the being of “something which can also be otherwise” than itself (Heidegger, 1997, pp.34-
5). Following this quote, Heidegger goes on to claim that “it is not at all a matter of course 
that Dasein be disclosed to itself in its proper being” - its true being (Heidegger, 1997). This 
discussion is crucial to understanding the later development of the concept of authenticity as 
the encounter of one’s own being or the truth of being-human. 
 
§2. Commentaries on Heidegger’s Interpretation of Primal Christianity 
As mentioned previously, there have been many excellent commentaries of Heidegger’s 
interpretation of primal Christianity. I will set the context for my interpretation of 
Heidegger’s lectures and writings on religion through a general and brief discussion of some 
of the pivotal themes in these commentaries. I will broadly touch upon three themes of 
relevance: what Heidegger finds in primal Christianity, how this serves as a ground for 
phenomenology, and the implications of Heidegger’s interpretation for his later engagements 
with religion or religious themes.  
 
A. The What:  
There is a general consensus that Heidegger found (if not sought from the outset) in Primal 
Christianity the ground for a philosophical notion of ‘authenticity’ (Capelle, 1997). This 
notion of authenticity does not refer to the personal; ethical, spiritual or psychological, but 
rather is called ‘factical’ – referring to the ontological (Caputo, 1993).  Authenticity, as such, 
refers to some sense of authentic-being; a being-truly, or properly human. In this case, 
authenticity pertains to an authentic experience of what it is to be human, and further, the 
ground for a genuine understanding – a philosophy proper Capelle, 1997; van Buren, 1994). 
The former discloses via primal Christianity the content of an experience of life as authentic 
(being) in a certain kind of temporality (van Buren, 1994; Sheehan, 1986) and a certain how 
of interpreting life in relation to meaning (Sheehan, 1986; Capelle, 2005).  The latter 
discloses the test or framework for an authentic understanding that is also a phenomenology 
as ontology (Sheehan, 1986; Capelle, 2005). What Heidegger finds in Primal Christianity, is a 
double point of origin for phenomenology: the ontological content of human existence and 
the ground of a genuine way of living philosophically. 
 
Primal Christian Experience and the Ground of a Genuine Philosophical Life: 
The ground of a philosophical life is intrinsically connected to the disclosure in advance of 
authentic factical experience in a certain way, i.e., the authentic facticity of understanding. 
Primal Christian experience is the context for this disclosure of an authentic factical 
understanding and therein allows of the disclosure in advance of a genuine understanding 
which in turn serves as the ground of a genuine philosophical life (van Buren, 1994). 
 Insofar as the disclosure of authenticity is equally (in this sense) the disclosure of 
being, the exposition of authenticity in primal Christianity also grounds phenomenology. The 
disclosure of an authentic sense of temporality in primal Christianity, then, is the disclosure 
of the temporality of being-Dasein (Capelle, 2005). Moreover, this disclosure of temporality 
forms the basis of Dasein’s intrinsic quest for being – to understand (van Buren, 1994).  
 Heidegger’s interpretation also served as a ‘how’ of overcoming metaphysics (as 
onto-theology); as a ground for a non-metaphysical way of questioning being (Sadler, 1996). 
In part, this destruction of metaphysics operated as a kind of philosophical theology, a 
philosophical Lutheran (Protestant) critique of the theological dimension of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics (Sadler, 1996). However, the primary aim was ontological, or an ontological 
revolution, which also at the same time leads to the discreditation of theology as a 
philosophical endeavour altogether (van Buren, 1994). The genuine philosophical life, in its 
ground disclosed via primal Christianity, forms the horizon for the question of Dasein as the 
primary question of philosophy – genuine only as ontology. 
 
Implications of the Interpretation of Primal Christianity: 
The implications of Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity for his thinking (in 
relation to theology and religion) are closely tied to the notion of the ‘turn’ (Kehre) (Kovacs, 
1990).3  Insofar as primal Christianity served as a horizon for the question of grounding 
philosophy there is a great deal of ambiguity as to how this interpretation formed or 
influenced Heidegger’s later thinking about religion. One of the consistent themes herein is 
the view that in the ‘turn’ Heidegger moved towards early Greek thinking (via Nietzsche) as 
a horizon for the proper discussion of religion in a non-metaphysical sense (Caputo, 1993). In 
this respect, early Greek thinking is viewed as the space in which Heidegger founded a rival 
(to Christian) sense of the holy (Caputo, 1993). This is paralleled in Heidegger’s 
investigations into Hölderlin, perhaps in the sense of a German history of being in relation to 
the divine (van Buren, 1994).  
 There are, then, two general themes in the commentaries pertinent to the implications 
of primal Christianity for Heidegger’s later thinking about religion. The first is that the 
‘demythologising’ or ‘ontologising’ of primal Christianity leads to a thinking that subsumes 
the divine under the truth of being (Caputo, 1993). The second theme is that Heidegger’s 
search for ground (in primal Christianity) operates within a prioritisation of the question of 
being in such a way that ontology becomes a religion of sorts (Kovacs, 1990; Sadler, 1996).  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The notion of the Kehre in Heidegger’s philosophy is a contested term. However, for the purposes of this paper  
the notion of Kehre is used solely insofar as it helps us place in context the changing relation Heidegger had 
with religion and religious phenomena. 
§3. Heidegger on Primal Christianity 
In turning to Heidegger’s interpretation of what he calls primal Christianity, through the 
translations of his lectures on religion, my aim is to draw out the implicit conception of 
religion that is developed therein. As such, the task is not so much to identify the ‘what’ or 
‘how’ of Heidegger’s approach to primal Christianity, but rather, to disclose the 
preconception of religion within his path of thinking.  
 
Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion  
When Heidegger attempts to address primal Christianity his primary agenda is the disclosure 
of factical existence in the sense of ‘how’ humans may experience and understand our own 
being ‘authentically’. In this respect Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity appears 
to achieve two interrelated endpoints: the positing of a certain religious experience of life as 
an authentic experience of being-human in the historical and ‘Chairological’ temporality, and 
further, the ‘demythologising’ of primal Christian experience. This accords with Heidegger’s 
stated task of the explication of concrete religious phenomena and the penetration of the 
ground (being) of these phenomena (Heidegger, 2004).  
 However, these results are played out within a second goal of the lectures, namely: the 
explication of fundamental religious experience and the quest to understand this experience in 
connection to all religious phenomena (Heidegger, 2004). Heidegger, then, cannot be seen to 
merely demythologise religious experience, but also, actively seek a sense of the meaning of 
religion in an ontological sense.4 The question (of this paper) therefore becomes: how does 
Heidegger conceive the meaning of religion, and further, what are the essential characteristics 
given therein? 
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 Universal: “all religious phenomena”, Ontological: “original” – grounding phenomena.  
 The conception of religion is initially driven by the matter of Heidegger’s thinking in 
a more general sense, e.g., the horizon of the ontological question of how beings are 
grasped/presented in their being. As such, the question of religion operates within the context 
of phenomenology-ontology in such a way that primal Christian experience discloses 
something about the character of the being of Dasein (the entity who presents) and this in turn 
discloses something about the essence of the meaning of religion. In the first instance, primal 
Christian experience discloses the being of Dasein as factical and thus historical (Heidegger, 
2004, pp.22, 86-88, 97). Accordingly, the initial turn preconceives religion as a life 
experience that is factical (grounded in the being of Dasein) and historical (as a way of living 
temporality) (Heidegger, 2004). Thus, in the first instance, religion is conceived by 
Heidegger as a kind of authentic factical experience grounded in being Dasein.  
 The key to Heidegger’s interpretation of the meaning of religion lies in the question of 
‘authenticity’, and moreover, the way Heidegger preconceives religious authenticity: the 
potential authenticity of a human relation with God and an authentic understanding of God.  
 The potential authenticity of the human relation to God, as Heidegger characterises it, 
pertains to the potential ‘authenticity’ of being Dasein. That is, the authenticity of religious 
phenomena is grounded upon an awareness or experience of what it is to be truly human (as 
Dasein) (Heidegger, 2004). As such, the first way of characterising the potential authenticity 
of religion is its meaning as a life that is authentically grounded in the being of Dasein. Of 
course, primal Christianity merely lives this authenticity and does not necessarily grasp 
(understand properly) the ground of itself. However, the primary character of the authenticity 
of religious phenomena is its belonging to the being of Dasein, i.e. the meaning of religious 
phenomena is its belonging to being Dasein.  
 As a phenomenon, then, religion is implicitly preconceived as the relation of being 
Dasein with God that may be characterised as authentic only insofar as it is grounded in what 
it is to be truly human. In this respect, the authenticity of primal Christianity is the way in 
which God is present in factical life as a ‘having become’ for humans in our being 
(Heidegger, 2004). Further, this authenticity belongs to the being of Dasein as enactment (a 
lived temporality) in which the sense of being of God is determined (Heidegger, 2004).  
 
Augustine and Neo-Platonism 
The second way Heidegger characterises the authenticity of religion focuses on the 
phenomenon of understanding God. Herein, Heidegger’s lecture on St. Augustine’s 
Confessions (Book 10) interprets the text within the context of the combination of theology 
and philosophy as a factical life (Heidegger, 2004a).  The point of origin for this analysis is 
the distantiation of theology from philosophy (Heidegger, 2004a).5 Theology, as such, is 
constituted via a relation of belief; the ontical science of belief as a historical phenomena 
(Heidegger, 1998). Philosophy, however, is the relation of humans to being-Dasein within the 
realm of comprehension (understanding).  
 The philosophical analysis of the meaning of religion centres on the possibility of an 
authentic human understanding of the ‘towards which’ of religion. For Heidegger, in the 
lectures on Augustine, this is God, gods, or the divine. The interpretation of the Confessions, 
insofar as it pertains to the essence of religion, focuses on the proper human understanding of 
God: what do I love when I love you? (Heidegger, 2004a) Herein, Heidegger interprets 
Augustine as understanding God as ‘the Truth’, and thus, the search for God the search for 
truth (Heidegger, 2004a).6  Therefore, the meaning of religion is a lived authenticity 
(grounded in Dasein’s being) in the truth; the truth of being human and an authentic relation 
to the truth as a being (Heidegger, 2004a).  
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 Heidegger quotes Kierkegaard from Sickness Unto Death: “To comprehend is the range of man’s relation to 
the human, but to believe is man’s relation to the divine.”  
6
 Heidegger is defining truth as ‘the truth of being’ 
The notion of religion within Heidegger’s interpretation of Primal Christianity: 
Within Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity the notion of religion is 
preconceived or presupposed in two primary ways. In the first instance, religion is 
preconceived as ‘religious phenomena’; a factical experience (faith/believing) that is 
grounded in the being of Dasein. This ‘preconceiving’ of religion is brought about through 
the phenomenological method wherein, for Heidegger, all human phenomena will be 
explicated with regard to the basic characteristics of being-Dasein. The search for 
philosophical ground, as such, transforms human experiences into indicative phenomena of 
what it is to be Dasein. The notion of religion, therefore, is ‘preconceived’ within the context 
of this transformation as necessarily a phenomena grounded upon being-Dasein. Thus, the 
preconception of religion is that it signifies a factical experience of what it is to be truly-
human, and its authenticity belongs to being-Dasein (Heidegger, 2004a).  
 Religion is presupposed as ‘factical experience’ within the context of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological interpretation insofar as it is granted, in some sense, the character 
‘authenticity’. Herein, the notion of ‘authenticity’ in Heidegger’s thinking implicitly signifies 
‘truth’, ‘truth of being’, or ‘true-being’. As such, primal Christianity is granted the character 
of ‘authenticity’ within the context of its factical experience of God as the truth that comes to 
presence as a being: a ‘fore-giving’ of truth as a phenomenon (Heidegger, 2004a).  Thus, the 
‘authenticity’ of primal Christianity implicitly belongs to the experiencing of truth and the 
meaning of religion therein presupposed as an ‘authentic’ factical experience of ‘the Truth’. 
 It can be seen that Heidegger’s turn to the essential meaning of religion as these two 
interrelated ‘factical experiences’ of truth already encapsulates a ‘turn’ in Heidegger’s later 
thinking, for a turn to what is traditionally called religion is no more than the path to thinking 
about ‘the truth’. Equally, Heidegger’s formulation of the meaning of religion transforms 
primal Christianity as a religious life into an example of an authentic existence insofar as the 
notion ‘authenticity’ intrinsically belongs with the notion of ‘truth’ in factical experience.  
 
§4. Heidegger on Early Greek Thinking and German Poetry.  
In providing an overview of Heidegger’s thinking in relation to what is traditionally called 
religion, or the realm of religion, my primary aim is to show how Heidegger constitutes 
religion as the factical experience of the truth of being (or simply the truth). Further, I aim to 
show that Heidegger sought to overcome religion (in its traditional form) by appropriating its 
ground and founding, therein, an authentic philosophical-ontological eschatology and an 
alternative ‘truly authentic’ factical experience of truth in poetry. Two primary themes will 
serve as a point of orientation for this overview: a) the meaning of religion is the factical 
experience of the truth and an encountering of the truth as a being but is not an understanding 
of the truth, and b) religion is a secondary phenomena to philosophy and the possibility of a 
genuine philosophical understanding of truth. 
 
Heidegger on Early Greek Thinking: 
In Heidegger’s Parmenides the interpretation of the meaning of religion appears to be a quite 
straightforward continuation of his characterisation of primal Christianity. A surface read of 
the text seems to indicate that the meaning of religion is the human encounter with the truth 
brought to presence as divinities. The text begins with Parmenides encounter with the 
goddess, Heidegger providing an argument that the goddess is the truth (Aletheia) – the truth 
experienced as a person (Heidegger, 1998a).  Towards the end of the text Heidegger returns 
to the seemingly ‘religious’, via a discussion of the ‘how’ of Greek-Dasein’s encountering the 
truth (of the emergence of being) as the divine or daemonic (Heidegger, 1998a). This ‘how’ 
is then discussed in relation to the being of Greek-Dasein; that Greek-Dasein presents the 
divine in the encounter with the truth as it emerges into presence (Heidegger, 1998a). As 
such, it appears that Heidegger intrinsically formulates religion to be the human encounter 
with the truth emerging as a being.  However, I would argue that in this text Heidegger seeks 
the ground of what gets called religion, or religious phenomena, and negates religion in the 
process.  
 In interpreting the fragments of Parmenides’ proem Heidegger’s primary concern is 
not the human encounter of the truth as an experienced phenomenon, nor as a potentially 
religious phenomenon. Rather, the question is that of Greek-Dasein’s relation with the truth 
in an ontological sense insofar as it discloses something about the essential character of 
Dasein as understanding, i.e. how Dasein understands being, and how the truth is essentially 
an emergence of beings and being for Dasein. Equally, the question is that of Greek-Dasein 
as a historical phenomenon; a phenomenon within the horizon of a Greek history of Being 
and the ‘authenticity’ contained therein that discloses the truth as emergence.  
 The text of Heidegger’s lecture on Parmenides, then, focuses on the disclosure of the 
horizon of Dasein’s being as a relation with being-itself (the truth as emergence) called the 
‘uncanny’ wherein the truth itself emerges into the realm of the ordinary (Heidegger, 1998a). 
The uncanny signifies ‘how’ in an ontological sense the truth is possible and therein discloses 
an ‘authentic’ encounter with truth. Further, that which is encountered (the truth as emergent 
as a being for Dasein) is named ‘divine’ only within the horizon of being for Greek-Dasein 
and the history of being belonging to Greek-Dasein. As such, the authenticity of the divine 
for Greek-Dasein is not fundamentally religious (in Heidegger’s interpretation), but rather, 
the naming of the presence of present being: the emergence of being-itself for Greek-Dasein 
Heidegger, 1998a). 
 This stance is reiterated in Heidegger’s and Fink’s lectures on Heraclitus. Again, 
Heidegger argues that for Greek-Dasein, the gods belong to what is (being), and further, that 
the notion Theos signifies being-itself (Heidegger & Fink, 1993). As such, humanity is a 
condition for the existence of the divine insofar as it is Dasein (in our being) that presents the 
divine in the understanding of being and as the being that understands (Heidegger & Fink, 
1993). The divine for Greek-Dasein, Heidegger asserts, is therefore not a religious notion, nor 
pertinent to religion, but is rather the naming of the presence of the truth of being as it is 
understood (Heidegger & Fink, 1993). The locus of the Greek sense of the divine within the 
realm of understanding is thus a purely philosophical notion that is essentially a naming of 
truth in itself as it emerges into and for Dasein. 
 The interpretation of early Greek thinking is marked by an appropriation of the 
ground of the religious by philosophy, and a philosophical overcoming of religious 
phenomena through the disclosure of what Heidegger believes to be the ontological structures 
of this ground. Herein, the overcoming is related to both the ground as a history of being (the 
tradition of theology as grounded in Greek metaphysics) and the ground of religion as an 
experiencing of truth.  
 Heidegger’s interpretation of early Greek thinking also serves as a third ground, 
namely: the foundation of an authentic philosophical-ontological eschatology of truth. This is 
expressed poignantly in the lectures on Parmenides wherein Heidegger attributes ‘a-theism’ 
to the absence of the divine which is also the horizon of the modern forgetting/withdrawal of 
being (Heidegger, 1998a). Philosophy, as a genuine factical life in the modern history of 
being, then takes up the task of destiny that brings being into presence: thinking that seeks the 
truth as the essence of emergence and thus brings ‘occidental humanity’ to the home region 
of the goddess aletheia (Heidegger, 1998a). Philosophy, for Heidegger, thus replaces religion 
with an ontological eschatology. This is only possible insofar as religion comes to be 
constituted as a phenomenon of inauthenticity (the fallen-ness of Dasein’s being) that serves 
as the everyday ground of a-theism (the withdrawal of being). Insofar as religion can no 
longer be constituted as an authentic encounter with the truth (as being) Heidegger will then 
seek to find an alternative ‘authentic’ encounter of the emergence of truth, namely: poetry.  
 
German Poetry (Hölderlin) as the ‘authentic’ alternative factical life. 
For Heidegger, the overcoming of religion is not simply a matter of the substitution of 
theology by the ontological, but is also the disclosure of an alternative more ‘authentic’ realm 
of Dasein’s encounter with the emergence of truth in factical experience. Herein, Heidegger 
supplants the need for religion in a traditional sense while considering the destiny of being 
for ‘German humanity’ via Hölderlin’s hymn ‘The Ister’ (Heidegger, 1997). The overcoming 
of religion produced here is disclosed not only as seeking a more ‘authentic’ factical 
experience, but moreover, a necessary denial of any ‘authenticity’ (primacy) of religious 
phenomena within Heidegger’s path of thinking.  
 The replacement of religion by poetry outlined in this text takes place implicitly 
within a reversal or negation of primal Christian experience wherein the Christian notion of 
sin and salvation are posited as an inauthentic negation (Heidegger, 1997). Accordingly, the 
primordial Greek and German humanity (in their relation of the foreign) together through 
their poets are called back to their essence: the homeliness of Dasein by the river – the 
dwelling and building place to which Dasein authentically (in our being) belongs (Heidegger, 
1997). Herein, the proper home of Dasein is with the holy: nature and the divinity presenced 
within the relation of Dasein and the power of nature (mother Germania) (Heidegger, 1997).  
 Heidegger can be seen to make two essential moves in this lecture on Hölderlin: the 
first to position the poet (as demigod) that replaces religious revelation, the second to 
pronounce through Greek and German poetry an eschatology of being as a becoming homely 
(Heidegger, 1997). This authenticity of the destiny of German Dasein, in becoming homely, 
is to become homely as one’s-self: to be grounded in Dasein’s essence, a being open to being 
in general as emergence, and thus, Germania – mother earth (Heidegger, 1997). 
 
§5. The Three Primary Themes of Heidegger’s Relation with Religion: 
In summary, there are three themes to be drawn out of Heidegger’s relation with religion: a) 
the phases of the relation, b) the necessity of overcoming religion, and c) the notion of 
authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking. 
 
Phases of Heidegger’s relation with religion 
In the first phase of Heidegger’s relation with religion, with respect to primal Christianity, he 
determines the essential meaning of religion to be the ‘factical’ experience of the truth of 
being in living. Herein, the phenomena of religion indicates a doubled experience of truth: the 
truth of the being of Dasein experienced in life, and the truth itself emerging (encountered) as 
a being. Primal Christianity, and thus religion, in this sense is essentially experiential and 
does not primarily refer to understanding. Rather, the essence of religion is a not-
understanding – a faith that is grounded in Dasein’s being without any necessary intrinsic 
connection to truth. Insofar as authenticity is a belonging to the truth of Dasein’s being or 
truth in general the potential authenticity of religious phenomena is historical and ontical, not 
ontological. Philosophical understanding, however, is essentially this seeking truth with 
regard to ground – to the emergence of truth - and as such, gains priority over religion by 
finding the ground of religious phenomena. Moreover, the essence of religion is a 
contingency: a ‘happening’ to experience the truth without any true understanding of the 
essence of truth. This is why Heidegger’s relation to religion, in the first instance, leads to an 
overcoming of traditional religion. 
 The second phase then follows in Heidegger’s interpretations of early Greek thinking 
wherein he seeks an authentic understanding of, or way of access to, the truth. This authentic 
philosophical-ontological understanding thus supersedes religion by disclosing the ground of 
religion (the ground of Dasein’s encounter with truth). The ‘contingency’ of religious 
phenomena, that may happen upon truth and equally miss the truth, then discloses the essence 
of religion to be a secondary or derivative phenomenon. Religion, as such, is grounded in 
Dasein’s being that seeks the truth, but is not an intrinsically authentic phenomenon. 
 The third phase, then, arises in Heidegger’s attempt to find an alternative to religion, 
in poetry, providing an ontological eschatology of the emergence of truth as a poetic 
experience. Heidegger characterises Christianity, and by implication the phenomenon of 
religion in general, as an intrinsically inauthentic encounter with the truth. The inauthenticity 
of religion is disclosed precisely in its lack of intrinsic connection to the truth of Dasein’s 
being and further, truth itself.  
 
The Necessity of Overcoming Religion 
To understand the necessity of overcoming religion, in Heidegger’s path of thinking, we must 
first come to terms with two dimensions of Heidegger’s preconception of religion: a) religion 
as theological and b) religion as experiential.  
 Heidegger’s preconception of religion as essentially experiential (ontical) is founded 
in his relation to theology and his formulation of phenomenology as ontological. Heidegger 
had two primary understandings of theology: via metaphysics and as an ontical science.  
Heidegger initially related to Theology in metaphysics as an abstraction of the everyday 
understanding of being and the inauthentic presupposition of metaphysical thought 
(Heidegger, 1997). Theology, as such, is intrinsically connected to the inauthenticity of 
metaphysics in its presupposing an entity as the ‘ousiological’ ground of presence. Further, 
the proper formulation of theology is therefore non-philosophical; theology is a science of 
faith as a historical/factical phenomenon (Heidegger, 1997).   
In this second relation to theology, then, there are at least two preconceptions about 
religion. First, that religion is properly addressed by theology (as a science) determines 
religion as a merely historical phenomenon. Moreover, the essence of religion as a historical 
phenomenon is ‘faith’ – a believing (understanding of believing) mode of existing towards a 
historical revelation (occurrence) (Heidegger, 1997). Faith, then, is not intrinsically 
‘authentic’, nor the ‘towards-which’ of faith necessarily pertinent to the essential/truth. Thus, 
a foundation for Heidegger’s rejection of religion is his relation with theology, or 
‘Christianity’ as a historical phenomenon. 
 Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology plays a pivotal role in his preconception 
of religion as a historical/experiential affair. Here, I would argue, Heidegger’s formulation of 
phenomenology repeats the prejudice contained within the history of philosophy, that the 
primary sense of being human is understanding. There is no doubt, whatever controversy 
surrounds the matter of Heidegger’s thinking or the meaning of Dasein (as a term), that the 
prioritisation of Dasein’s being in Being and Time signifies the prioritisation of being human 
as understanding (Heidegger, 1962; Heidegger, 1996a).7 As such, Heidegger’s 
phenomenology does not aim to explicate the being of humans in general (a philosophical 
anthropology as he calls it), but is rather a fundamental ontology – disclosing the essential 
ontological structures of Dasein’s being (being-understanding) (Heidegger, 1996a). Thus, 
there is a certain irony in Heidegger’s relation to religion insofar as it is grounded in a 
prioritisation of Dasein’s being: leading to a denial of the authenticity of religion as non-
essential for Dasein (not within the realm of understanding), but also an understanding of the 
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 The John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson translation is: “Dasein is in such a way as to be something which 
understands something like Being… temporality as the being of Dasein, which understands being.” 
Stambaugh’s Translation  reads: “Da-sein is in such a way that, by being, it understands something like being.” 
The locus of the term ‘Dasein’ as such is undoubtedly related to the traditional philosophical preconception of 
being human as being-rational.  
meaning of religion subsumed within Dasein. Religion, then, cannot be authentic because it 
does not intrinsically pertain to Dasein’s being-understanding, and further, loses any 
ontological significance when it is preconceived as an experience of truth grounded in 
Dasein’s being. 
 This is precisely, in my view, why Heidegger constitutes religion as a phenomenon of 
factical experience, for it doesn’t belong intrinsically to Dasein’s being. Further, the 
approaches to religion born out of theology all tend to be ‘ontical’ scientific and historical – 
providing Heidegger with a convenient point of origin for the consideration of religion 
subsumed under Dasein’s being in an everyday sense. Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein’s 
being, therefore, explains the necessity of overcoming religion insofar as this prioritisation 
led to an ignorance/ignoring of any aspect of being human that does not pertain to the region 
of understanding. The ignored regions, then, are turned into experiences grounded in 
Dasein’s being.  
 
The Notion of Authenticity in Heidegger’s path of thinking: 
The problem of authenticity also revolves around Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein, for the 
notion of authenticity therein can only signify the truth of being; what something really is or 
the truth itself (as an identity). In this way, Heidegger’s thinking is forced (through the 
internal logical consistency of his thinking) to seek a replacement for religion not only 
because religion is preconceived as other to understanding, but also insofar as religious 
notions of authenticity (especially that of Christianity) tend to be diametrically opposed to 
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity as truly being Dasein. Heidegger’s later move to poetry 
and art, as such, can be seen to operate in this necessity to replace religion with factical 
experiences more comfortable with the authenticity of Dasein’s being-understanding. 
However, it is precisely in the opposition to Heidegger’s notion of authenticity that religion 
begins to say something about Heidegger’s path of thinking. 
 
5. Concluding Questions:  
I would like to conclude with a reflection upon Heidegger’s relation to religion in such a way 
that religion poses some questions for Heidegger’s thinking. There are, then, three primary 
questions I think religion poses to Heidegger’s path of thinking, namely: the question of 
religion as a phenomenon of being-human, the question of authenticity and the question of 
truth. Operating within all of these questions is the question of the limit of Heidegger’s 
thinking in its fundamental character, namely: the question of the delimitations of the 
prioritisation of Dasein. 
 
The Question of the meaning of religion? 
George Kovacs remarks, in his critical reflection of Heidegger’s relation to the question of 
God, that Heidegger never asked ‘how’ religion belongs to human existence, nor its meaning 
as a relation to the ‘other’ (Kovacs, 1990). I would posit this critical remark in a much 
stronger sense: that Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein leads to blindness towards the 
question of being-human in general that is the ground of religious phenomena. Heidegger 
assumes, herein, that religion is a phenomenon grounded in Dasein’s being and as such, 
cannot see the question posed by religion as a phenomenon, namely: how are humans in our 
being able to be religious? Religion, herein, poses an ontological question to which 
Heidegger’s thinking has no point of entry. 
 
 
 
The Question of Dasein’s Authenticity? 
The phenomenon of religion also poses two challenges to Heidegger’s notion of authenticity 
as being-truly-human or being-properly-one’s-self. These challenges are posed even within 
Heidegger’s interpretative relation with religion and are marked by strained and forced 
interpretations of religious thought. An example of the first (religious authenticity) can be 
found in Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul, and the latter (religious/ethical authenticity) in 
the interpretation of Aristotle.  
  In relation to Paul’s letter to the Romans, we find Heidegger providing an incredibly 
strained account wherein the authenticity disclosed by Paul is implicitly interpreted to signify 
‘being-Dasein’ (Heidegger, 2004, p.88). This reading goes against both the general gist of the 
text: that humans tend towards sin (as an ontological argument we could say: the tendency 
towards sin signifies that being-human is to be-sin-full), and the following argument in this 
particular text: the ground of this authenticity is not human (not I) but God.8 In this respect, 
then, primal Christianity as an expression of the phenomenon of religion resists and opposes 
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity.  
Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, serves as the basis for 
his rejection of the validity of theology as a valid part of philosophy (Heidegger, 1997, §24-
25, 32).  Juxtaposed to Heidegger’s emphasis on the ontological dimensions of Dasein in the 
ethics is Aristotle’s statement: “But such a life (Sophia) would be too high for man; for it is 
not insofar as he is man that he will live so, but insofar as something divine is present in 
him.”(1177b26-27) The authenticity under discussion, here, is only ontological in the sense of 
ethos: of the ground of good and the being of humans in relation to this ground. As such, 
Aristotle (contra Heidegger) provides an argument which characterises the being of humans 
as not-being-good (“it is not insofar as he is man”) and the ground of good ‘Theos’ (“insofar 
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 Romans, 8: Heidegger interprets the first half of this chapter, but avoids the second half which constitutes 
authenticity as the death of the ‘sinful nature’ and God living in us.  
as something divine is present in him”).  Thus, in the second instance, the religious sense of 
authenticity poses an ontological question that cannot be answered in Heidegger’s path of 
thinking, namely: what is the ground, in an ontological sense, of the question of good, and 
further, the question of why are we alive? 
 This then brings us to the fundamental question brought to bear against the path of 
Heidegger’s thinking disclosed via religion in relation to the notion of authenticity, namely: 
the question of the arche. I would argue that the dimension of metaphysics called Theology 
does not pertain solely, or even primarily, to the notion of highest being or beings as a whole 
(as Heidegger suggests), but rather refers to the Greek ‘religious’ question of the arche – the 
original/originary ground. This question can be explicated further via the question of truth.  
 
The Question of Truth. 
Heidegger’s reading of pre-Socratic thinking serves as the basis of his key expositions on the 
truth as aletheia and Theos as the truth of being emerging into presence through Dasein. Yet, 
ironically, from the religious problematic, pre-Socratic thinking may also be read as the 
denial of the priority of being and the prioritisation of the question of arche (originary 
ground). The fragments of Parmenides proem serve as a point of orientation for this 
question.9 Herein, Parmenides’ encounter with the goddess ‘truth’ (and Heidegger’s much 
celebrated goddess ‘aletheia’) provides a divine revelation of two paths of truth. The first 
way of truth is being: “It is, and it is not possible for it not to be” (Fr:2).  
 The second path of truth is more poignant here: “that it is not, and that it is bound not 
to be: this I tell you (my emphasis) is a path that cannot be explored; for you could neither 
recognise that which is not, nor express it.” (Fr:2) Let me just speculate for a moment here: 
first, that this path is one of truth-full-ness, and moreover, a path denied to you the human 
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 All quoted fragments, referenced as (Fr:) in the body of the text are from: Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the 
Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Freeman, 1996) 
being as understanding being, i.e. is an ontological statement about Dasein. The first, then, 
indicates that ‘that which is not’ is truth in some fashion, the second that ‘that which is not’ is 
a way of truth beyond (otherwise than) human Dasein (understanding). Is this second path 
then, the truth of the divine, while the first is the truth of being-Dasein? This speculative 
question makes sense of a line of fragment 8: “nor shall the force of credibility ever admit 
that anything should come into being, besides being-itself, out of not-being” (the arche of 
being). 
 This second path of truth in Parmenides is closely related to the question of arche in 
pre-Socratic thinking (and Greek philosophy in general) as an intrinsically religious and 
ethical question that is also (I would argue) ontological – that is: the question of originary 
ground, the ground of being that is not-being. I cannot do justice to this problem here, but it 
does suggest a major limitation in Heidegger’s thinking insofar as the religiosity of the 
question also clears a space in which the prioritisation of Dasein may also be questioned and 
disclosed in its limits.  
If we acknowledge that the phenomenon of religion belongs-to and expresses the 
being of humans then it is apparent that the concepts of Dasein and authenticity in 
Heidegger’s philosophy are both problematic. The phenomenon of religion reveals something 
about being human that exceeds the limits of Dasein, namely: our capacity to be in relation to 
the truth as otherwise than being via the questions of the possibility of good and 
meaning\purpose. Thus, the ontological question posed by religion would be: ‘who are we in 
our being, that the otherwise than being is an issue for us?’ 
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